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INTRODUCTION

In 1964, Congress passed comprehensive legislation aimed at
eradicating discrimination in employment, public accommodations,
public facilities, public schools, and federal benefit programs.1 Title
VII of this Act directed its aim specifically at stamping out prejudice
in employment.2 Four years later, the Supreme Court resurrected3 the
1. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
2. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
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provisions of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,4 which, among other
things, protects citizens, regardless of race or color, in their right to
"make and enforce [employment] contracts."5 Together, Title VII and
§ 1981 serve as the primary legal bases for challenging racially dis
criminatory actioris by private employers. More than thirty years after
the passage of Title VII and the Court's resurrection of § 1981,
though, society continues to feel the lingering effects of America's his
tory of slavery and segregation in the field of employment.6 A study by
the Urban Institute in the late 1980s and early 1990s determined that
black job applicants continued to face discriminatory treatment at all
levels of the hiring process.7 In view of the continuing effects of dis
crimination in employment, a number of civil rights organizations
around the country have employed testing as a means of ferreting out
discrimination in the hiring process.8
"[A] 'tester' is an individual who, without the intent to accept an
offer of employment, poses as a job applicant in order to gather evi
dence of discriminatory hiring practices."9 The testing process usually
involves the dispatch of pairs of equally credentialed candidates, one
black and one white, to job interviews.10 Organizations that conduct
employment testing ensure equivalency within the pairs by selecting
3. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) ("'The fact that . . . [the Civil
Rights Act of 1866) lay partially dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish its force
today.'" (quoting the oral argument of the Attorney General)).
4. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; see also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60
(1976) ("Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled among the Federal
Courts of Appeals - and we now join them - that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race." (internal notes omitted)).
6. Daniel M. Tardiff, Knocking on the Courtroom Door: Finally an Answer from Within
for Employment Testers, 32 LOY. U. C HI. L.J. 909, 909-10 (2001).
7. Michael J. Yelnosky. Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and
Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 403, 410 (1993); see also MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES
DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 37-66 (1991)
(laying out the findings of the Urban Institute study).
8. Shannon E. Brown, Tester Standing Under Title VII, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117,
1119-20 (1992).
9. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 291 n.l (7th Cir. 2000) (citing
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 370, 374 (1982)).
10. Brown, supra note 8, at 1120. The literature and case law in this area have to date
focused upon the use of testing in the context of discrimination on the basis of race or color.
Testing, however, may prove valuable to ferret out discrimination on the basis of national
origin, sex, and other characteristics as well. See, e.g., Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of
Am. v. City of Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations, 748 N.E.2d 759, 770 (111. App. Ct.
2001) (testing for sexual orientation discrimination); Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Coun
cil of Greater Wash., Inc., 683 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C. 1996) (testing for sex discrimination);
Elizabeth E. Theran, "Free To Be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious": Weight-Based Discrimina
tion and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
113, 163 (2001) (testing for weight-based discrimination).
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testers with similar personalities and providing them with similar
backgrounds, credentials, and interview techniques.11 These testers re
port back regarding their experiences in the interview process, and the
organization analyzes these reports, combined with the outcomes of
the interview process, to determine whether the employer is engaging
in discriminatory hiring practices.12 The information provided by these
testers can constitute invaluable evidence of discrimination in the job
market. Whereas the single applicant can provide only anecdotal evi
dence regarding her experience, testing provides comparative evi
dence that can strengthen an individual plaintiff's initial complaint un
der Title VII or § 1981.13
While testing serves as a useful tool in the fight against employ
ment discrimination, many employers have challenged the practice as
unethical, deceptive, detrimental, and costly.14 They argue that testing
increases the costs of hiring, as employers must expend valuable inter
viewing resources on candidates who have no interest in actual em
ployment.15 Whereas the costs associated with finding each qualified
candidate may be limited in some industries, for example, food serv
ice, these costs can be quite high in areas such as professional services.
In these areas, employers spend significant monies to attract each can
didate; the loss of a qualified applicant to maintain a spot for a covert
tester can result in an inability to fill the spot with a suitably qualified
candidate.16 Moreover, employers have characterized testing as en
trapment, because testers, like undercover agents, utilize false creden
tials to misrepresent themselves to the intended object of the entrap
ment.17
11. Brown, supra note 8, at 1120.
12. Id. at 1120-21.
13. See Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 414; see also Michelle Landever, Note, Tester Standing
in Employment Discrimination Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1 981, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 381, 382
(1 993).
14. Tardiff, supra note 6, at 956; see also EEOC's Endorsement of Testers in Bias Cases
Could Lead to Abuses, Employers' Group Charges, 31 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at
A-10 (Feb 14 1 991) (noting views of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, an umbrella
organization of large employers, that employment testing amounts to "trickery and deceit,"
"fraud," and "deception").
.

,

15. Tardiff, supra note 6, at 956 ; see also EEOC's Endorsement of Testers in Bias Cases
Could Lead to Abuses, Employers' Group Charges, supra note 14.
16. Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 414-15; see also Equal Employment Advisory Council
Letter on Proposed Testing Policy at EEOC, 31 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at E-1 (Feb.
14, 1 991) :

[The EEOC's tester policy] ignores all the time employers will waste and expense they will
incur in interviewing, evaluating, testing, and checking the references of persons who have
no real interest in employment. It also fails to consider the opportunities that will be lost
when employers discover that their top-ranked candidates are testers only after it is too late
to bring back other qualified candidates who had a sincere interest in being hired.
17. Tardiff, supra note 6, at 956; see also EEOC's Endorsement of Testers in Bias Cases
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These policy arguments regarding the merits of employment test
ing, though valuable to social discourse about the proper means of
achieving a colorblind society, fail to reach the primary legal question
currently surrounding employment testing - the question of standing
for employment testers. The doctrine of standing encompasses two
distinct sets of limitations upon the ability of prospective plaintiffs to
maintain discrimination suits in federal court: judicially-created pru
dential requirements18 and constitutionally-mandated limitations.19
The circuits that have considered whether testers can meet either. the
constitutional or prudential standing requirements to sue for damages
or prospective relief2° have split, failing to achieve consensus on the
ability of testers to satisfy the standing requirements under either Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.22 The Fourth
Circuit has determined that testers do not possess standing under Title
VIl,23 while the Seventh Circuit has found the requisite basis for
standing under the statute.24 The D.C. Circuit has also held against
standing for testers under Title VII, but, so far, only with regard to
their ability to seek prospective relief.25 With regard to standing under
Could Lead to Abuses, Employers' Group Charges, supra note 14 at A-10; Alex Young K.
Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination: An Ethical and Legal Analysis, 7
GEO. J. L EGAL ETHICS 473, 498 (1993).

18. The prudential standing requirements recognized by the Court derive not from
Article III of the United States Constitution but rather from concerns about judicial self
governance. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). These self-imposed standing require
ments prevent plaintiffs from asserting the rights of third-parties, id., litigating generalized
grievances common to either all citizens or a broad class of citizens, id. at 499, or seeking
judicial intervention in an area that is not "arguably within the zone of interests to be pro
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Ass'n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). These requirements, though, may
be waived by express congressional action. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)
("Congress legislates against the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which ap
plies unless it is expressly negated." (citations omitted)).
19. The Court also recognizes three constitutionally-based limitations on the ability of a
plaintiff to maintain standing before the Court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992). These limitations require that the plaintiff show that she has suffered an in
jury cognizable under the constitutional or statutory provision cited as the basis for relief,
that her injury can be causally linked to the alleged actions of the defendant, and that a fa 
vorable decision by the court would redress her injury. Id. (These requirements are com
monly referred to as injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.) Unlike with the prudential
requirements, Congress lacks the power to abrogate these standing hurdles. Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997).
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "prospective" as "effec
tive or operative in the future"); id. at 1293 (defining "relief' as "redress or benefit,
esp[ecially] equitable in nature (such as an injunction or specific performance) that a party
asks of a court").
21. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1994).
22. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1994).
23. See Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 1978).
24. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 298-99 (7th Cir. 2000).
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§ 1981, the Seventh and D.C. Circuits have ruled against testers,2 6
while the Eleventh and Third Circuits have accorded testers standing
to pursue their claims.27
This Note argues that, while employment testing may serve a laud
able purpose in identifying discrimination and in gathering evidence of
discriminatory treatment, employment testers do not meet the re
quirements for standing under either Title VII or § 1981. Part I main
tains that employment testers do not suffer the requisite injury-in
fact28 necessary for standing to seek compensatory damages under
Title VII and further that testers cannot meet the redressability29 re
quirements for prospective relief. Part II contends that testers also
may not seek standing under § 1981, as they fall outside the zone of
interests30 that Congress sought to protect with the statute. Finally,
Part III argues that the purposes of the standing doctrine - to main
tain proper respect for separation of powers between the coequal
branches of the federal govemment31 - require that standing for em
ployment testers be granted not by judicial fiat but only through con
gressional action. This Note concludes that employment testers cannot
satisfy the standing requirements to pursue suits under either Title VII
or § 1981; moreover, in light of the courts' responsibility to defer to
Congress as creator of statutory bases for standing, any close question
regarding tester standing should be resolved against a recognition of
standing.
25. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d
1268, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
26. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 302; BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1271.
27. Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985); Meyers v. Pennypack
Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1977).
28. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (defining injury-in-fact as
"an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical" (internal citations and quotations omit
ted)); id. at 560 n.1 ("By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way.").
29. Id. at 561 (noting that, in order to meet the redressability requirement, "it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable deci
sion" (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
30. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) ("The ques
tion of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the ques
tion whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3-19, at
446-47 (3d ed. 2000) :
[T]o say that a particular plaintiffs claim does not fall within the zone of interests of a given
constitutional provision is another way of saying that the right claimed is one possessed not
by the party asserting it, but rather by others, and that the plaintiff will not have standing to
assert a violation of these rights of absent third parties, whose claims would fall within the
applicable zone of interests.
31. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine ofStanding as an Essential Element ofthe
Separation ofPowers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
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EMPLOYMENT TESTER STANDING UNDER TITLE VII

This Part contends that employment testers fail to meet the mini
mum requirements necessary for standing to seek either compensatory
damages or prospective relief under Title VII. Section I.A argues that
employment testers do not suffer the injury-in-fact necessary to pursue
Title VII compensatory damages, while Section I.B maintains that
employment testers cannot meet the redressability prong essential to
achieve standing for prospective relief.
A.

Injury-in-Fact and Compensatory Damages

Though most plaintiffs face the prospect of satisfying both the con
stitutional and prudential standing hurdles,32 in the Title VII context,
Congress has waived the prudential standing requirements33 so that
litigants may assert standing to the "outermost limits of Article IIl."34
Congress, however, may not waive the Article III standing require
ments.35 Thus, in order to maintain standing under Title VII, employ
ment testers must plead sufficient facts to demonstrate injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability.36 The injury alleged by employment test
ers, discriminatory treatment at the hands of an employer or employ
ment agency, meets the causation requirement, as the injury can be di
rectly traced to the alleged actions of the defendant.37 In addition,
taking into consideration the purpose of compensatory damages under
Title VII, to provide a "meaningful monetary remed[y] for all forms of
workplace harassment,"38 a favorable damage award could redress the
alleged injury of an employment tester.39 Nevertheless, while the in32. See supra note 18 (describing the prudential standing requirements).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994); see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 209 (1972) (finding, in context of suit under Title VIII, that "person claiming to be ag
grieved" language - present in both Title VIII and Title VII - indicates congressional in
tent to extend standing to Article III limits).
34. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000); accord Spann v.
Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626
F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980).
35. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. ,
397 U.S. at 154; see also Doe v. Nat'I Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999)
(noting, in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, that Congress may not, "by
statute alone," confer standing absent "actual injury").
36. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also supra note 19
(describing the Article III standing requirements).
37. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
38. Statement of President George Bush upon Signing S. 1745 (Civil Rights Act of
1991), 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1701 (Nov.25, 1991).
39. Compensatory damages under Title VII are provided under the terms of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b) (1994), which provides for punitive damages in cases where the plaintiff proves
"malice" or "reckless indifference" and for compensatory damages capped based upon the
size, in terms of number of employees, of the defending firm. See also RESTATEMENT
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jury alleged by an employment tester satisfies both the causation and
redressability prongs of the Article III standing requirements, this Part
demonstrates that employment testers do not suffer an injury-in-fact
cognizable under Title VII.
1.

Umbrella of Statutory Protection

In order to satisfy the injury-in-fact aspect of the Article III
standing, employment testers must show the invasion of a legal right
created either by the Constitution or a statute.40 Because no constitu
tional provision, absent congressional action, directly provides protec
tion against private discriminatory action in employment, the
Constitution itself cannot provide an independent foundation for em
ployment tester standing.41 Pursuant to its power under the Commerce
Clause, however, Congress may make private discrimination unlawful
in the economic realm.42 Nevertheless, in creating statutory rights, the
invasion of which would create standing, "Congress must at the very
least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the
class of persons entitled to bring suit."43 In crafting Title VII, Congress
failed to create a specific statutory interest that would protect testers;44
Title VII, by its very terms, extends its protection only to those seek
ing employment.45 Employment testers do not seek employment;
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 903 (1977) (" 'Compensatory damages' are the damages awarded to a
person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him."); id. at§ 905
(noting that compensatory damages may properly be awarded for nonpecuniary, emotional
harms).
40. TRIBE, supra note 30,§ 3-16, at 400-01:
a court must ask whether the injury claimed by the plaintiff qualifies as the type of
harm that satisfies Article III. For example, a person subject to criminal prosecution, or
faced with its imminent prospect, has clearly established the requisite 'injury in fact' to op
pose such prosecution by asserting any relevant constitutional (or other federal) rights. (em
First,

phasis added).

41. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (determining that Congress
may give effect to the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment but failing to find a basis for
a private right of action within the text of the Thirteenth Amendment itself); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject
matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment."); accord United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
599-600 (2000) (reaffirming the central holding of the Civil Rights Cases that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not reach private conduct); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 512-14
(1975) (finding that plaintifrs claim of injury to their ability to enjoy "the benefits of living in
a racially and ethnically integrated community" was not judicially cognizable under Article
III absent a statutory basis).
42. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
n.3 (1973) ("Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute." (citations omitted)).
43. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44.

See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1994).

45. See id.
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rather, they seek information about a particular employer's hiring
practices.46 Whether adverse or not, the action taken by the employer
fulfills the tester's objectives by providing information about the em
ployer's hiring practices.47 Any injury suffered by the tester as a result
of a discriminatory hiring decision does not fall within Title VII's um
brella of statutory protection - an umbrella intended to protect indi
viduals in their pursuit of employment opportunities.48
Housing testers, on the other hand, possess standing under Title
VIII49 to pursue claims for discriminatory treatment in the sale or
rental of property precisely because Congress created a specific right
in all individuals to be free from misrepresentations about the avail
ability of housing.50 Title VIII provides that "[it shall be unlawful] [t]o
represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for
inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available."51
In Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman,52 the Supreme Court relied
upon this specific statutory language to find that Congress had created
a particular statutory right under which housing testers could claim
standing.53 The Court founded its decision to accord standing to hous
ing testers upon the injury-in-fact suffered when a tester receives mis
information about the availability of housing, misinformation made
illegal by § 804(d) of Title VIII.54 In fact, the Court noted that the
housing tester suffers an "injury in precisely the form that the statute
was intended to guard against."55 Not only did Congress create such a
46. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 292 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 370, 374 (1982)).

47. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 1120-21.
48. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (M.D. Ga.
1987) ("[H]e . . . would be nothing more than a test plaintiff who never intending to accept
employment with Woodmen, he has not been - could not have been - damaged by their
failure to hire."). But see Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300 (noting that the emotional effects of dis
criminatory treatment are "cognizable and compensable harms" under Title VII);
Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash. Inc., 683 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C.
1996) (finding that a local human rights ordinance, like Title Vil, creates a general right to
be free of discrimination).
49. 42 u.s.c. § § 3601-3631 (1994).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994); Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373.
51. 42 u.s.c. § 3604(d).
52. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
53. Id. at 373 ("Congress . . . conferred on all 'persons' a legal right to truthful informa
tion about available housing."); accord Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526
(7th Cir. 1990); see also Steven G. Anderson, Tester Standing under Title VII: A Rose by Any
Other Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217, 1251-1252 (1992).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373.
55. Havens Realty Corp. , 455 U.S. at 373; accord Fair Employment Council of Greater
Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Congress had
clearly conferred a cause of action on the [housing] testers [under] § 804(d)."); cf. Lujan v.
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specific right in Title VIII, but Congress also explicitly recognized the
role of testing in the Title VIII statutory scheme, granting to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development the authority to
contract with private groups to perform housing testing for investiga
tive purposes.56
In crafting Title VII, however, Congress not only failed to create a
broad statutory right in the employment field comparable to the "right
to truthful information" enacted in Title VIII57 but also neglected to
recognize a role for testing in the administration of its statutory
scheme.58 In relevant part, Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's [mem
bership in a protected class] ... or to limit, segregate, or classify his em
ployees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
[membership in a protected class].59

While the language of Title VII aims broadly at discrimination in em
ployment, the statute contains no specific statutory right to truthful in
formation regarding the availability of employment opportunities.60
Rather, the statute protects those individuals who seek employment.61
On the statute's face, the injury-in-fact necessary for standing under
Title VII stems from the loss of an opportunity to be employed or the
loss of employment opportunities within the context of one's current
employment.62
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or con
troversy where none existed before . . . .").
56. 42 U.S.C.§ 3616a(b)(2) (1994):
The Secretary shall use funds made available under this subsection to conduct, through con
tracts with private nonprofit fair housing enforcement organizations, a range of investigative
and enforcement activities designed to (A) carry out testing and other activities in accor
dance with subsection (b)(l) of this section, including building the capacity for housing in
vestigative activities in unserved or underserved areas.
-

57. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373. Compare 42 U.S.C.§ 3604(d) (1994) (includ
ing prohibition on misrepresenting the availability of housing to anyone), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (1994) (failing to include such protection for employment applicants).
58. Compare 42 U.S.C.§ 3616a(b)(2) (including specific mention of testing in Title VIII
statutory scheme), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (failing to mention testing of this sort
within Title VII).
59. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2); see also id. at§ 2000e-2(b) (granting the same protection to protected class members from discrimination by employment agencies).
60. See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e.
61. Id. at§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
62. Anderson, supra note 53, at 1258 ("If strict standing rules control, Title VII testers
may not possess the credentials that courts have required for adjudication."); cf. Trafficante
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Of course, the text of Title VII includes the term "applicant."63
Taken out of context, this term could be read to include employment
testers, for they act as applicants in order to accomplish their objec
tives. Nevertheless, such a reading would ignore a central canon of
statutory construction, "that the meaning of a word cannot be deter
mined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is
used."64 Taking a holistic view of the language of Title VII, not only
does the prepositional phrase "for employment" follow the term "ap
plicant," but "applicant" also nests among six mentions of "employee"
or "employment."65 The term "applicant" cannot be removed from the
overall context of employment, or more precisely, the necessity of the
applicant to actually be seeking employment.66 Moreover, the unlawful
employment practice - limiting, segregating, or classifying employees
or applicants on an impermissible basis - must "deprive or tend to
deprive" the applicant of "employment opportunities."67 Testers
plainly do not fit within this overall textual context; the employment
tester's only employment relationship stems not from a relationship
with the employer with whom she interviews but rather from her em
ployment relationship with the testing organization. The employer's
refusal to hire, thus, does not and cannot diminish the employment
opportunities of the tester.68
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (noting that, absent
the specific congressional creation of a statutory right under Title VIII, he "would have great
difficulty in concluding that petitioners' complaint in this case presented a case or contro
versy within the jurisdiction of the District Court under Art. III of the Constitution");
Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that standing for
housing testers "is, as an original matter, dubious"); Dash T. Douglas, Standing on Shaky
Ground: Stancling Under the Fair Housing Act, 34 AKRON L. REV. 613, 616 (2001) ("[O]n its
face, the standing of [housing] testers is questionable. They have no intent to rent or pur
chase a home or apartment when they encounter the discrimination." (notes omitted)).
63. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
64. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (citations omitted); see also United
States Nat'! Bank of Or. v. l ndep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993) (quoting
NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941)) ("(T]ext consists of words living 'a
communal existence' . . . the meaning of each word informing the others and 'all in the ag
gregate tak[ing] their purport from the setting in which they are used.' ").
65. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (extending statutory protection to "applicants for em
ployment" (emphasis added)); see also supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). This term has engendered no debate in the case law as to
its meaning, and Title VII itself fails to provide a specific definition of "employment oppor
tunities." See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e (1994); cf 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1994) (failing to provide a spe
cific definition of "employment opportunities" in the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (failing to provide a specific definition of "employment op
portunities" in the Americans with Disabilities Act). For the purposes of this Note, "em
ployment opportunity" has been interpreted simply to mean the opportunity to be em
ployed.
68. See Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 1978) ("Such 'test' plain
tiffs are not, of course, harmed by a refusal to hire since they are not seriously interested in
the job for which they apply."); see also Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88-89 (4th Cir.
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Pro-Standing Policy A rguments: Begging the Question

Although Title VII, especially when read in comparison with Title
VIII, does not, by its terms, create a specific statutory right protecting
employment testers, advocates for recognizing standing for testers
contend that the broad policy goals behind the nation's civil rights
laws favor recognizing standing in this context.69 Specifically, these
supporters argue that a broad reading of the Supreme Court's holding
in Havens Realty and congressional intent behind Title VII favor
finding a statutory basis for tester standing within Title VII.
Both the Seventh Circuit and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") have found that the Supreme Court's ruling in
Havens Realty affirmatively answers the question of whether employ
ment testers are entitled to standing under Title VII.70 In granting
standing to employment testers, the Seventh Circuit in Kyles v. J.K.
Guardian Security Services71 determined that, while Title VII did not
contain a provision similar to the Title VIII provision relied upon by
the Havens Realty court, "the logic of Havens" still supported a ruling
in favor of the testers.72 The court reasoned that Havens Realty em
braces standing for testers that " 'were treated in a racially discrimina
tory fashion, even though they sustained no harm beyond the dis
crimination itself.' "73 The EEOC similarly has noted that the injury
necessary for standing under Havens Realty "is disparate treatment
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, rather than the

1971) (affirming district court judgment that plaintiff testers were not entitled to relief in the
form of backpay); cf Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032
(M.D. Ga. 1987) ("A plaintiff whose primary purpose in interviewing for a job is to create
the basis for a Title VII EEOC charge and lawsuit, is not the bona fide applicant for a job
that he must be to establish a prima facie case."); Allen v. Vaughns, 538 F. Supp. 833, 843
(D. Md. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that bona fide application neces
sary to make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII).
69. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, WHETHER "TESTERS" CAN
FILE CHARGES AND LITIGATE CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, Policy Guid
ance 915.002, at Section III.A.I (1996), available at http:l/www.eeoc.gov/docs/testers.html
[hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE} ("Standing is generally interpreted broadly
under employment discrimination laws to achieve the statutory goal of equal employment
opportunity."); Anderson, supra note 53, at 1236:
Congress's objective in enacting Title VII is plain from the language of the statute . . . . The
remedies provision of Title VII accords the right to a private cause of action to any 'person
claiming to be aggrieved' . . . . [S]cholars assert that the Act is aimed more expansively at re
dressing job discrimination in general.
70. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 298-99 (7th Cir. 2000); EEOC
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section III.A.
71. Kyles, 222 F.3d 289.
72. Id. at 297-98.
73. Id. at 297 (quoting Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1527 (7th Cir.
1990)).
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loss of employment or housing."74 Taking this broad view of the
Havens Realty holding, both the Seventh Circuit and the EEOC have
found that "humiliation, embarrassment, and like injuries" resulting
from discriminatory treatment and suffered by testers represent ac
tionable harms under Title VIl.75
The Seventh Circuit and the EEOC, however, base this argument
for standing upon a cursory and overbroad view of the Supreme
Court's holding in Havens Realty . Private discriminatory action, even
where it leads to embarrassment or humiliation, is not actionable un
der federal law absent a proper statutory basis.76 In fact, the Court in
Havens Realty relied upon specific statutory language in Title VIII to
find a basis for according standing to housing testers.77 Admitting that
Title VII does not create a specific statutory interest that would pro
tect testers, the Seventh Circuit instead noted that the discriminatory
treatment of an employment tester creates an injury-in-fact by limiting
not only the tester's employment opportunities but also those of all
other minority applicants.78 The relevant . language of Title VII,
though, emphasizes the opportunities available to a specific individual,
requiring a relationship between the employer and a specific employee
or applicant.79 The statutory text does not contemplate the unsubstan
tiated and conjectural prospective employment opportunities of other
imaginary applicants.80 Absent a more concrete foothold for statutory
standing under Title VII, the logic followed by the Court in Havens
Realty remains inapposite to the employment tester context.81 While
both the Seventh Circuit and the EEOC have tried to effectuate
Congress's goals of eradicating discrimination, they have done so in

74. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section IIl.A.2.
75. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300; see also EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at
Section 111.A.3 (noting that testers may suffer "stigmatization" and are marked with a
"badge of inferiority") (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 413 n.1 (1975) (White, J., dis
senting)); Anderson, supra note 53, at 1267 ("[Testers] may claim injury from being denied
the benefits of a work environment free of discrimination."); cf. TRIBE, supra note 30,§ 3-16,
at 404 ("The legal interest impaired . . . need not be tangible or economic.").
76. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
77. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982); see also Trafficante v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972} (White, J., concurring).
78. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 298.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a}(l}-(2) (2000} (making unlawful, inter alia, an employer's
failure or refusal to hire "any individual," which requires that the employer have a relation
ship with a specific individual about whom a hiring decision can be made).
80. Id.
81. See Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373.
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the absence of a statutory basis for recognizing that standing82 and, in
doing so, have violated standing doctrine.83
Of course, Title VII, as part of Congress's legislative program to
attack discrimination throughout society, may be read broadly to ac
cord wide protection to victims of discriminatory treatment.84 In
crafting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, individual members of Congress
expressed in grand terms their intent to eradicate discrimination
throughout American society.85 In Kyles, the Seventh Circuit re
sponded to these sentiments in upholding standing for employment
testers, finding that, in constructing the language of Title VII,
"[Congress] created a broad substantive right that extends far beyond
the simple refusal or failure to hire."86 The Kyles court noted that Title
VII, in taking broad aim at discrimination in the employment sector,
permits individuals to sue for statutory violations as private attorneys
general and signals Congress's desire to extend standing under Title
82. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994) (including prohibition on misrepresenting the
availability of housing to anyone), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (1994) (failing to in
clude such protection for employment applicants).
83. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Even the broadest interpretations of
standing under Title VIII, recognizing standing to pursue causes of action for the loss of the
benefits of living in an integrated community, are inapposite to the tester context. See
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 113-14 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210, 212 (1972). The Gladstone and Trafficante decisions recog
nized an injury-in-fact under Title VIII, where the plaintiff was directly injured as a member
of the community in which residential segregation was occurring. Id. An employment tester's
injury, if any, does not even come within this broader view of injury-in-fact under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as a tester is not and will not be a member of the "community" in which
the alleged discrimination is occurring, those applicants and employees directly affected in
their employment opportunities by a particular employer's adverse and discriminatory em
ployment actions. Cf Havens Realty Corp. , 455 U.S. at 377 ("It is indeed implausible to ar
gue that petitioners' alleged acts of discrimination could have palpable effects throughout
the entire Richmond metropolitan area . . . . Our cases have upheld standing based on the
effects of discrimination only within a 'relatively compact neighborhood.' " (emphasis in
original)).
84. Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to be accorded a liberal construction in order to carry out the
purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of racial
discrimination.'' (internal citations and quotations omitted)); EEOC ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section III.A.1; Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination
Testing: Theories of Standing and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
1, 19 (1994).
85. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at l, 30 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2517 (statements of Rep. McCulloch):
Aside from the political and economic considerations, however, we believe in the creation of
job equality because it is the right thing to do. We believe in the inherent dignity of man....
All vestiges of inequality based solely on race must be removed in order to preserve our
democratic society, to maintain our country's leadership, and to enhance mankind.
Id. at 2487; 110 CONG. REC. 12,619 (1964) (statements of Sen. Muskie) (remarking that the
Act would finally allow the Nation to begin to achieve the ideals expressed in the Preamble
to the Constitution).
86. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Srvs., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir. 2000).
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VII to the limits of Article IIl.87 Moreover, employment testers who
face discriminatory treatment at the hands of employers or employ
ment agencies experience the lingering vestiges of the once institu
tionalized discrimination that Congress sought to eradicate through its
civil rights legislation.88 Each of these factors contributed to the
Seventh Circuit's finding of a sufficient basis for according standing to
employment testers.89
Broadly reading the purposes underlying Title VII, however, does
not mean that the courts must defer to every novel attempt to assert
standing under the statute. While some members of Congress did state
the purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title VII quite broadly,9()
at no point did Congress actually consider the import of the statutory
language defining unlawful employment practices.91 The most direct
reference to these provisions in the congressional debate came from
Senator Edmund S. Muskie: "I submit that, read in their entirety,
these provisions provide a clear and definitive indication of the type of
practice which this title seeks to eliminate."92 Yet, this most direct ref
erence is conclusory, providing no substantive explanation of the
reach of the unlawful employment practices provisions.93 In fact, no
substantive change was made to the unlawful employment practices
provisions of Title VII after the Act was reported out of the House
Judiciary Committee.94 Moreover, the text of the House Judiciary
Committee's report itself does not speak to the purposes behind or the
scope of the unlawful employment practices provisions.95
87. Id. at 297-98.
88. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section 111.A.2 ("The injury is
disparate treatment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, rather than the loss
of employment or housing.").
89. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300.
90. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
91. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 1005 (1968) [hereinafter EEOC
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (noting that, with the exception of the addition of sex as a forbid
den basis of discrimination, no substantive changes were made to the unlawful employment
practices provisions during Title VIl's consideration by the full House and Senate). The
relevant statutory language defining unlawful employment practices has been codified at 42
U.S.C.§§ 2000e-2(a)-(d) (1994).
92. 110 CONG. REC. 12,618 (1964).
93. See id.
94. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 1005; see also 110 C ONG. REC.
12,721, 12,722-24, 12,818-20 (1964) (noting that the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute amend
ment, which eventually was passed as Title VII, made no change to the unlawful employ
ment practices sections); id. at 12,812 (illustrating that the annotated version of the bill,
showing the changes between the House and Senate versions of the bill, contains no changes
to the unlawful employment practices provisions); id. at 12,863-67 (containing the Clarke
Case substitute amendment, which, though not adopted, also made no attempt to alter the
unlawful employment practices provisions).
95. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.2391.
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Most of the references to the purposes of the employment provi
sions by congressional committees during this period came during the
House Education and Labor Committee's consideration of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, the provisions of which were largely
incorporated into or influenced the provisions of Title VII.96 In its re
port, the Labor and Education Committee focused on the positive
economic benefits that would inure to members of minority groups if
they were able to secure employment on a footing equal with whites.97
The Committee also called attention to the positive economic benefits
that would flow to the nation if employment opportunities could be
equalized, focusing specifically on lessening the need for welfare assis
tance among minorities and enhancing labor utilization in an increas
ingly competitive global economic environment.98 These concrete
goals focus upon the benefits that stem from employment itself. An
employment tester does not suffer any injury to her employment
prospects; in fact, performing the testing itself fulfills her employment
objectives.99 Congress cannot be said to have foreseen or to have had
in mind in crafting Title VII the types of injuries, wholly unrelated to
an individual's own employment opportunities, that could be suffered
by employment testers.
B.

Redressability and Prospective Relief

Employment testers also cannot satisfy the requirements for the
redressability prong100 of the Article III standing inquiry. In order to
meet the redressability requirement for prospective relief,101a plaintiff
must show a real and immediate threat of injury.102 Redressability, in
the context of prospective relief, requires this threat of continuing in
jury because the prospective relief can only redress the plaintiff's in
jury if she is among those receiving benefits of that relief.103 Employ
ment testers, however, cannot meet this requirement, as they, by

96. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 2155.
97. H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 2-3 (1962).
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 44-48, 67-68 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 29.
101. See supra note 20; see also 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(g){l) {1994) (including injunction,
reinstatement, hiring, backpay, or "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri
ate" as forms of prospective relief for intentional discrimination under Title VII); id. at
2000e-5(g){2) (including declaratory or injunctive relief but denying reinstatement, hiring,
promotion, or backpay as equitable relief in mixed motive cases under Title VII).
102. Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983).
103. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984) ( 'The necessity that the plaintiff who
seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. III
requirement.' " (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976)).
"
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definition, will not be among the class of persons who would benefit
from prospective relief granted against a particular employer.104 In
Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., v. BMC
Marketing Corp.,105 the D.C. Circuit, following the Supreme Court's
analysis in Lyons v. City of Los Angeles,106 held that employment test

ers lacked standing to pursue prospective relief.107 While tester plain
tiffs may assert that the emotional harms caused by the defendant's
alleged discriminatory actions cause continuing harm, the D.C. Circuit
noted that, under Lyons, the continuing effects of a prior injury, ab
sent a likelihood of a future separate injury, are insufficient to estab
lish standing for prospective relief.108 Employment testers cannot meet
this burden as their lack of interest in either present or future em
ployment with the defendant erases the possibility of them receiving
any personal benefit from the issuance of prospective relief.109
Proponents of standing for testers argue that denying prospective
relief undermines the strength of Title VII by eliminating a key
weapon for the eradication of workplace discrimination. 110 Daniel M.
Tardiff argues that "adherence to the Lyons standard amounts to
'arch-formalism' and is completely inconsistent with the broad stand
ing given by Title VII and accorded by the courts in civil rights
cases."111 In addition to agreeing with Tardiff that applying the Lyons
standard would undermine congressional intent, the EEOC argues
that the text of Title VII "permits a court to award an injunction based
on past discrimination without requiring the plaintiff to make a sepa-

104. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d
1268, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 766.
105.

28 F.3d

1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

106. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). While at least one district court held that the Lyons analysis
applies only where the plaintiff seeks prospective relief against a governmental actor,
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240-41 (S.D. Cal.
1999), several circuit courts have applied the Lyons rubric in suits against private defen
dants. Bowen v. First Family Fin. Servs., 233 F.3d 1331, 1340 (1 1th Cir. 2000) ; Armstrong v.
Turner Indus., 141 F.3d 554, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1 998); lmagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co.,
976 F.2d 1 303, 1 308-09 (9th Cir. 1992).
107. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1272-75.
108. Id. at 1273 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8).
109. Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 437 (while arguing for the positive effects of employ
ment testing program, admitting that testers "do not meet the 'personal benefits' require
ment for injunctive relief').
110. See, e.g., EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section Ill.A.3
("[T]o deny injunctive relief to individuals who prove that they were victims of a pattern of
discrimination undermines congressional intent to deter discrimination by permitting indi
viduals to function as private attorneys general."); Tardiff, supra note 6, at 957-58
("[D]enying testers standing for equitable relief will leave less incentive for employers to
comply with Title VII.").
111. Tardiff, supra note 6, at 958.
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rate showing of likely future harm."m The EEOC notes that Title VII
permits a court to "impose injunctive relief whenever 'the [defendant]
has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice,' " allowing prospective relief even for past dis
criminatory acts.113
These arguments fail to reach the crux of the issue. First, the statu
tory language of Title VII relied upon by the EEOC to justify injunc
tive relief against past discrimination requires that the defendant have
engaged in an "unlawful employment practice."114 Discrimination
against an employment tester, while objectionable, is not an "unlawful
employment practice" under the Act, as Title VII only provides pro
tection to those desiring actual employment opportunities, which a
tester admittedly does not.115 Thus, prospective relief would not be
available under the statute to enjoin this behavior. Second, even if the
statute intends to permit the courts to extend such prospective relief,
the statute itself cannot confer upon the courts the power to issue such
relief.116 Congress lacks the power to abrogate the Article III standing
requirements.117 Even if Congress intended the result proffered by the
EEOC, the standing requirements of Article III still require that a
prospective plaintiff show that the requested relief will redress his in
jury.1'8 While employment testers may be able to assert emotional
harm stemming from discriminatory treatment, their lack of interest in
pursuing employment opportunities with the defendant prevents any
assertion that the defendant's conduct presents a sufficient likelihood
of future harm to the plaintiff.119
C.

EEOC's Enforcement Guidance and Judicial Deference

In 1996, the EEOC reaffirmed an earlier enforcement guidance,
finding that employment testers possess standing under Title VIl.120 As
the administrative agency vested with primary authority to pursue the
goals of Title VII, 121 the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII should ar-

112. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section 111.A.3 (citing 42
U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(g) (1994)).
113. Id.
114. 42 u.s.c.§ 2000e-5(g).
115. See supra notes 44-48, 67-68 and accompanying text.
116. Doe v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
117. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
118. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
119. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc.,
1268, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

v.

BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d

120. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section I.
121. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(a) (1994).
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guably be granted respect by the courts.122 The Supreme Court has
held that, because the EEOC lacks rule-making authority, EEOC en
forcement guidances are not entitled to deference123 under Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.124 Nevertheless, the
Court has also found that pronouncements like the enforcement
guidances issued by the EEOC may still be accorded respect.125 Re
cently, in United States v. Mead Corp. ,126 the Supreme Court reaf
firmed its holding in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ,127 defining the level of
deference properly accorded to statutory constructions of administra
tive agencies that lack the force of law: "The fair measure of deference
to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the
agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and
to the persuasiveness of the agency's position."128 The Court has also
recognized that whether an administrative interpretation is issued con
temporaneously with the legislative act in question bears upon the re
liability of that interpretation in reflecting congressional intent and
thus also upon the proper weight to be accorded the agency's pro
nouncement.129
122. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) ("[T)he well-reasoned views of the
agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort fo r guidance.' " (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-140 (1944)); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235
(2001) (reaffirming continuing validity of Skidmore deference analysis).
123. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) ("[C]ourts properly may accord less weight to [EEOC]
guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the
force of law . . . . '); see also Anderson, supra note 53, at 1266 (though arguing for validity of
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, admitting that the guidance "certainly does not possess the
force of law"); cf. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations
such as those in opinion letters - like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do not warrant
Chevron-style deference.'').
'

124. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
125. Mead, 533 U.S.at 276-77.
126. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
127. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
128. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40).
129. Udall v.Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (determining that administrative interpreta
tions deserve respect "[p)articularly . . . when the administrative practice at stake involves a
contemporaneous construction of a statute by" the agency charged with its enforcement)
(quoting Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. lnt'I Union of Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961));
accord United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 216 n.13 (2001); Davis
v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice,
491 U.S. 440, 463 n.12 (1989); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S.
426, 438 (1986); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S.259, 272-73 (1981); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (applying the contemporaneous criterion in determining
the level of respect to accord EEOC guidelines); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'I
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 465 & n.38 (1986) (same); EEOC v. Assoc. Dry Goods Corp.,
449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981) (same).
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Admittedly, the EEOC carefully and formally creates its policy
guidances and exercises primary executive authority in the field of
employment discrimination.130 The Commission, however, did not as
sert its position that Title VII accords standing to employment testers
contemporaneously with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.131
The EEOC's original 1 990 enforcement guidance trailed passage of
the Act by twenty-six years - by seventeen years more than the
EEOC guidance that the Supreme Court declined to follow in General
Electric Company v. Gilbert.132 The EEOC's interpretation deserves
some respect based upon its consistency, careful formulation and the
agency's status as the primary enforcer of employment rights laws.
Nevertheless, given the non-contemporaneous nature of the interpre
tation and the EEOC's lack of rule-making authority, the level of re
spect accorded the EEOC's policy guidance should turn upon the per
suasiveness of its position133 - an issue founded upon the proper
reading of the statutory language of and the congressional intent be
hind Title VII.134 The statutory language and legislative history of Title
130. See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5 (1994).
131. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section I (noting that original
policy guidance on employment testers was promulgated in 1990); see also supra note 129
and accompanying text.
132. Compare EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section I (noting
that the latest policy guidance builds upon the original guidance, produced in 1990), with
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) ("The EEOC guideline in question does
not fare well under these standards. It is not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII,
since it was first promulgated eight years after the enactment of that Title.").
133. The courts have yet to articulate a consistent method for analyzing persuasiveness
under Mead. Compare Heartland By-Products v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126, 1135 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), with James v. Zemenszky, 284 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In Heartland By
Product, the Federal Circuit, for example, held that the power of an agency to persuade de
pends on "its logic and expertness . . . the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the va
lidity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors that give it power to persuade." 264 F.3d at 1135 (internal quotations and citations
omitted); accord Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This ap
proach, though, reinserts two other Mead factors - consistency and expertness - into the
persuasiveness analysis. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at228. The same circuit in James, on the
other hand, independently analyzed the persuasiveness of an agency's position under Mead
by considering the position in light of the statutory text and legislative history in question.
284 F.3d at 1319 (citing Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 2176); see also U.S. Freightways Corp. v.
Comm'r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 270 F.3d 1137, 1145 (7th Cir. 2001) (treating "per
suasiveness" as a separate inquiry under Mead). This Note maintains that the James ap
proach to the persuasiveness analysis should govern, as it treats the persuasiveness prong as
an independent variable rather than double counting criteria to increase the apparent per
suasiveness of an agency position. Cf. Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984):
Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute only sets the framework for judi
cial analysis; it does not displace it. A reviewing court must reject administrative construc
tions of [a] statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent
with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement.
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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VII, however, undermine the persuasiveness of the EEOC's position
on standing for employment testers.135
·

II.

EMPLOYMENT TESTER STANDING UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981

This Part argues that employment testers cannot meet the standing
requirements necessary to pursue claims for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Section II.A notes that, unlike under Title VII, employment
testers pressing § 1981 claims must overcome prudential standing re
quirements. Section 11.B makes the case that employment testers fall
outside the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute in
question. Section 11.C maintains that public policy arguments prof
fered by supporters of tester standing under § 1981 are insufficient to
overcome the requirements of the standing doctrine.
A.

Applicability of Prudential Standing Requirements

The traditional standing analysis includes both constitutionally
based Article III requirements as well as judicially created prudential
standing requirements.136 Whereas plaintiffs pursuing Title VII claims
need only satisfy the Article III requirements, due to congressional
waiver of the prudential concerns,137 no such waiver has been found
with respect to § 1981.138 Under Title VII, congressional intent to
waive prudential standing requirements could be fo und in the statute's
broad definition of the claimant class - "person claiming to be ag
grieved. "139 Indeed, " [h]istory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a
134. James, 284 F.3d at 1319, (determining that agency position "is unpersuasive be
cause [the agency] . . . has not pointed to any statutory basis for [its] finding"); Student Loan
Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1155, 1167 (9th Cir. 2001)
(considering congressional intent in determining persuasiveness of Secretary's position un
der Mead); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
135. See supra notes 44-48, 58-68, 90-98 and accompanying text (determining that the
statutory text and legislative history of Title VII do not evince a desire on the part of Con
gress to accord standing to employment testers); cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
434 (1971) ("Since the Act aml its legislative history support the . . . [EEOC's] construction,
this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress." (empha
sis added)).
136. See supra notes 18-19.
137. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000); accord EEOC
v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980).
138. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 303.
139. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(b) (1994); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209
(1972) (finding that such language present in both Title VIII and Title VII indicates congres
sional intent to extend standing to Article Ill limits); see also Dept. of Commerce v. United
States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 328-29 (1999):
Congress has eliminated any prudential co!lcerns in this case by providing that "[a]ny person
aggrieved by the use of any statistical method in violation of the Constitution or any provi
sion of law (other than this Act), in connection with the 2000 census or any later decennial
census, to determine the population for purposes of the apportionment or redistricting of
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congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly - beyond the
common law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which
'prudential' standing traditionally rested."140 Section 1981, though,
does not contain the "aggrieved" language previously relied upon by
the Court to find congressional waiver of prudential standing require
ments.141
Arguably, the language of § 1981, which extends its statutory pro
tection to "any person,"142 could be interpreted to encompass an even
broader class of claimants than would be included in the traditional
"aggrieved" language. In Bennett v. Spear,143 the Court expanded its
view of standing where Congress used the term "any person" to define
the permissible plaintiff class under the Endangered Species Act. 144
This instance, however, can readily be distinguished from the § 1981
context. The Bennett Court itself noted that its view rested not upon
the inclusion of the term "any person" in the statute but rather upon
the fact that the legislation's subject matter, the legislation's purpose
to promote enforcement by private attorneys general, and the partici
pation of the government in the statutory enforcement scheme fa
vored an expansive view of standing. 145 While one might rightly argue
that civil rights statutes deserve as great a deference to j udicial inter
pretation of their reach as environmental statutes, § 1981 does not in
clude any indicia that the rights granted by its text are meant to be en
forced by litigants acting in the role of "private attorneys general."146
The role of private attorneys general has most often been recognized

Members in Congress, may in a civil action obtain declaratory, injunctive, and any other ap
propriate relief against the use of such method." (emphasis added).
140. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) (citations omitted); see also Dept. of
Commerce, 525 U.S. at 328-29 (extending standing to Article III limits by virtue of congres
sional inclusion of term "aggrieved" in defining to whom the act extended); Gen. Instrument
Corp. of Del. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., Inc., 197 F.3d 83, 89 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Ass'n of
Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 363 (5th Cir. 1999) (same).
141. 42 U.S.C.§ 1981(a) (1994).
142. Id.
143. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
144. Id. at 165.
145. Id.; see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 561 (5th Cir.
2001) (declining to find negation of prudential standing requirements under the Lanham
Act, even though the Act accorded to "any person" the right to bring suit); Conte Bros.
Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1998) (same).
146. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public
Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. lNT'L LAW 219, 222-23
(2001) (noting that the role of private attorneys general is to enhance the government's own
enforcement mechanisms); see also Robert A. Anthony, Zone-Free Standing for Private
Attorneys General, 7 G EO. MASON L. REV. 237, 237 n.l (1999) (outlining role of private
attorneys general in seeking judicial review of agency action or aiding the enforcement of
statutory programs).
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either where the harm in controversy is diffuse147 or where the actual
injured party cannot vindicate its own rights.148 The harm envisioned
by § 1981, on the other hand, is specific; here, Congress created a legal
framework to protect individuals in their specific contractual dealings
with others. 1 49 Moreover, the role of private attorneys general is to en
hance the enforcement activities of governmental agencies.1so Section
1981, unlike the Endangered Species Act or Title VII, does not pro
vide for government enforcement or involvement in litigation. 1s1 As a
whole, § 1981 lacks the factors that motivated the Court in Bennett to
negate its prudential standing requirements. 152
Some have argued that important public policies underlying the
passage of § 1981 support lessening the standing hurdles for claimants
under this section. 153 The Third Circuit, determining that Congress had
waived the prudential standing requirements with respect to § 1981,
found that a strict reading of the requirements of the prudential
standing doctrine would frustrate the public policy goals reflected in
both Title VII and § 1981.154 During consideration of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Congress even noted that Title VII and § 1981 should be
treated as "co-extensive."15s Nevertheless, attributing an intent to
waive § 198l's prudential standing requirements to this congressional
statement would violate traditional canons of statutory construction in
the standing area, which require Congress to "express[ly] negate"
these standing requirements.156 Moreover, congressional intent to
147. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (recognizing role of
private attorneys general in pursuing claims for injury due to loss of "the social benefits of
living in an integrated community").
148. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'! Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1981) (noting role of private attorneys general in enforcing ESA to protect endangered spe
cies).
149. 42 U.S.C.§ 1981(a) (1994).
150. Buxbaum, supra note 146, at 223.
151. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994) (describing role of EEOC in Title VII en
forcement), and 16 U.S.C.§ 1540(g)(2)(A)-(B) (1994) (describing [role] of government in
ESA enforcement), with 42 U.S.C.§ 1981 (failing to note any role for the government in en
forcing§ 1981).
152. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
153. Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971); Landever,
supra note 13, at 394.
154. Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446-47.
155. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975). Bllt see Fair
Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1278 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (citing Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459) (determining that the "co-extensive" language
used by Congress "simply mean[s] lhat the two statutes co-exist[ ], with the result that Title
VII . . . [does) not pre-empt whatever rights an individual might enjoy under§ 1981.") (em
phasis omitted).
156. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997); see also supra note 139 and accompa
nying text (describing language that meets express negation requirement).
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waive prudential standing requirements must be part of the contempo
raneous adoption of or subsequent amendment to a statute.157 The
congressional statement at issue here, though, occurred during consid
eration of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, almost a century after the pas
sage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866.158 Any relevant congressional
belief in the effects of § 1981 statutory language upon the prudential
standing requirements would have required either an expression by
the Thirty-Ninth Congress of its intent or an amendment to the statute
by a subsequent congress.159 While congressional intent behind pas
sage of the provisions of § 1981 aimed broadly at discrimination, the
necessary evidence of congressional desire to waive prudential stand
ing requirements remains lacking.160

B.

Statutory Zone of Interests

The Judiciary's self-imposed prudential standing requirements
prevent plaintiffs from asserting the rights of third parties, litigating
generalized grievances common to either all citizens or a broad class
of citizens, or seeking judicial intervention in an area outside the zone
of interests "arguably . . . protected or regulated by the statute or con
stitutional guarantee in question."161 Employment tester plaintiffs
157. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[T]he views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."); accord
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980);
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 269 (1965); see also United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1947).
158. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1278.
159. See Price, 361 U.S. at 313.
160. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 303 (7th Cir. 2000).
161. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also
Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S.
464, 475 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974); supra note 18 (describing the prudential standing
requirements). Some commentators continue to argue that the zone of interests test is one of
limited application. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 434, 446. A proper determination of the correct
application of the zone of interests test suffers from the Court's own muddled jurisprudence
on the purpose of the zone of interests prong. Compare Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S.
388, 400 n.16 (1987) ("The principle cases in which the 'zone of interest' test has been ap
plied are those involving claims under the APA [Administrative Procedure Act], and the test
is most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of§ 702 [of the APA]."), with Valley
Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 475 (including zone of interests among the prudential
concerns to be considered by the Court in reviewing the Establishment Clause case before
it). The Court, however, has now resolved this issue in favor of including zone of interests
"among [its] other prudential standing requirements of general application." Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (emphasis added). In fact, in the years following the Bennett
decision, the circuit courts of appeals have applied the zone of interests test in a wide variety
of statutory and constitutional contexts. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184,
1207-08 (11th Cir. 2002) (Clean Air Act); Oxford Assocs. v. Waste System Auth., 271 F.3d
140, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2001) (Commerce Clause); Casumpang v. lnt'I Longshoreman's and
Warehouseman's Union, Local 142, 269 F.3d 1042, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2001) (Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act); Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v.
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clearly do not seek solely to assert the rights of third parties; in their
chosen role as testers, these individuals suffer individual, emotional
harm due to discriminatory treatment. 162 In addition, while testers
share an interest in attacking discrimination with the citizenry as a
whole, this common interest does not undermine the tester's claim of
individualized harm.163 Nonetheless, the employment tester plaintiff
does not fully satisfy the prudential requirements, as her injury does
not come within the statutory zone of interests created by § 1981.
1.

Statutory Text

While the zone of interests test does not require that Congress ex
press a specific intent to benefit the particular plaintiff before the
court, in order for her case arguably to come within § 1981 's zone of
interests, an employment tester must demonstrate that either the
statutory language itself or congressional intent aimed to include test
ers within the class of claimants able to bring suit under the statute.164
The language of § 1981 provides for the recognition of every citizen's
right "to make and enforce contracts" to the same extent "as is en
joyed by white citizens."165 Subsection (b) defines "make and enforce
contracts" to include "the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 1 66 On its face,
Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 2001) (Supremacy Clause); On the Green Apartments
LLC v. City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2001) (Dormant Commerce Clause);
San Xavier Dev. Auth. v. Charles, 237 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001) (General Allotment
Act); In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure); Sac and Fox Nation of Mo. v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566, 575 (10th Cir. 2000)
(Indian Commerce Clause); Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 51 (1st Cir. 2000)
(Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
162. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300; see also EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69,
at Section III.A.2.
163. Landever, supra note 13, at 387; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734
(1972) ("[T]he fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather
than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial pro
cess.").
164. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498
U.S. 517, 524-26 (1991); see also Weber, 212 F.3d at 51 ("As noted, we review the language
and structure of . . . [the statute] to determine whether [plaintiffs] retaliation claim falls
within the zone of interests protected by [the statute).").
165. 42 U.S.C.§ 1981(a) (1994).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 198l(b) (1994). Section 198l(b) was added by Congress in 1991 in re
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989). In Patterson, the Court held that "harassment relating to the conditions of employ
ment is not actionable under§ 1981 because that provision does not apply to conduct which
occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to en
force established contract obligations." Id. at 171. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added sub
section b to§ 1981 in order to make clear Congress's intent to protect contracting parties,
especially employees, even after contract formation. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)); see also Mass v.
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the purpose of the statute is to protect those individuals who seek to
enter into a contractual relationship.167 Thus, in analyzing whether
testers come under the statutory umbrella of § 1981, one must focus
attention upon whether a tester who faced discriminatory treatment
has arguably been denied the right to make or enforce a contract.
No one would suggest that a tester, who does not even seek to
form an employment relationship with the employer in question, could
suffer any injury based on the performance, modification, or termina
tion elements of the statute or from a limitation of her ability to enjoy
a continuing contractual relationship. Moreover, testers do not desire
to make or enforce contracts;168 " [a]t most . . . [employers] deprive[ ]
the tester plaintiffs of the opportunity to refuse to enter into an em
ployment contract."169 In fact, the contractual relationship sought by
the tester, based upon misrepresentations not only of her desire for
employment but also of her qualifications for the job, is voidable by
the employer.17° Section 1981 protects the contractual rights of non
white citizens to the same extent as those rights might be "enjoyed by
white citizens."171 The basic premises of contract law, however, make
clear that no one who materially misrepresents herself in contract ne-

Martin Marietta Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Colo. 1992) (noting that the Act "ex
pands the scope of section 1981 . . . overturning the limitations judicially imposed on section
1981 by [Patterson)"). Interestingly, in passing the Act, Congress expanded the scope of
"make and enforce contracts" under § 1981 only to provide greater protection for individu
als after the formation of a contractual relationship. See 42 U .S.C. § 1981(b). The Act, in fact,
made no mention of a congressional desire to expand the definition of "making" contracts to
give greater protection to individuals like testers. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
167. Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 19%) ("A claim for inter
ference with the right to make and enforce a contract must allege the actual loss of a con
tract interest, not merely the possible loss of future contract opportunities.").
168. See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 302 (7th Cir. 2000); cf Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.l (1992) (confirming that standing must be con
sidered from the perspective of the plaintiff by noting that "the injury must affect the plain
tiff in a personal and individual way").
169. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d
1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
1 70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1978) ("If a party's manifesta
tion of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other
party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipi
ent."); see also Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Appellants
attempted to obtain the seller's consent to sale by a fraudulent and material misrepresenta
tion. The loss of an opportunity to enter into such a voidable contract is not an injury cogni
zable under § 1981."); BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1271 ("Any resulting contracts between
the tester plaintiffs and BMC [the defendant] would have been voidable at BMC's option . . .
Even on plaintiffs' argument, then, BMC did not deny the testers the opportunity to enter
into a contract that they could have enforced."); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 162(1)(a) ("A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his asser
tion to induce a party to manifest his assent and the maker (a) knows or believes that the
assertion is not in accord with the facts . . . . ").
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
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gotiations develops a legally protected contract interest in the fonna
tion of a voidable contract.172 In fact, a legally protected interest in the
formation of a voidable contract inures only to the object of the mis
representations - in this case, the employer - not to the party mak
ing the misrepresentations, the tester.173
While, from the perspective of a discriminating employer, the
tester has been denied the opportunity to make an employment con
tract, standing doctrine neither is an objective test nor does it turn on
the subjective perceptions of a party other than the plaintiff.174 Courts
analyze both the prudential and Article III standing requirements
from the perspective of the plaintiff, in this case, the tester.175 In the
tester's case, the employer has only denied her the opportunity to en
ter into a voidable contract, a contract interest to which she has no le
gal right and for which she can obtain no legal protection.176 Absent
actual formation of, or intent to fonn, a legally protected contractual
interest177 on the part of the tester, any injury suffered by the employ
me·nt tester lies outside the zone of interests protected by § 1981.178

172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1); cf Kawitt v. United States,
842 F.2d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[A] job obtained by an admitted and material misrepre
sentation is not a property right upon which a constitutional suit can be founded.").
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1); see also BMC Mktg. Corp.,
28 F.3d at 1271 ("In any event, the rule that contracts obtained through misrepresentations
are merely voidable rather than void seems designed entirely to protect the target of the mis
representations.") (emphasis in original).
174. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 3-14, at 385 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)
("Standing differs, in theory, from all other elements of justiciability by focusing primarily
'on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court' . . . .").
175. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) ("We have consistently stressed that a
plaintiffs complaint must establish that he has a 'personal stake' in the alleged dispute, and
that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992) (noting that the standing inquiry focuses upon injury done to
the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff will be benefited by redress); Air Courier Conference
of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 524-26 (1991) (noting that the
zone of interests inquiry focuses upon whether Congress intended to include a person in the
position of the plaintiff among the class able to bring suit); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n,
479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987) (same).
176. See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.
177. Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that § 1981 pro
tects against "the actual loss of a contract interest"); see also id. (declining to recognize the
"general interest in . . . [the] merchandise" plead by the plaintiffs as a cognizable interest
under § 1981).
178. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d at 289, 304 (7th Cir. 2000); accord
BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1271; see also Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 421
(4th Cir. 1984) (finding that housing testers did not have standing to sue under §§ 1981 and
1982); Davis v. The Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 342, 347 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (finding that only
couple who actually sought apartment, and not testers, could recover under § 1982 for dis
criminatory treatment). Contra Open Housing Ctr. v. Samson Mgt. Corp., 152 F.R.D. 472,
476 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Landever, supra note 13, at 386 ("[W]here a tester is denied his
right to the initial formation of a contract, that denial gives rise to an injury sufficient to con
fer standing under § 1981.") (internal quotation omitted).
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Congressional Intent

Congressional intent, like the text of § 1981 , fails to provide the
requisite safe haven for employment testers. The Civil Rights Act of
1866 aimed to destroy the vestiges of slavery that continued to mani
fest themselves in relations between blacks and whites following the
Civil War179 and, more specifically, to counteract provisions of the
Black Codes.180 The Codes forced blacks to enter into long-term em
ployment contracts, mandated harsh criminal sanctions for violators of
the labor provisions of the Codes, and apprenticed young blacks to
their former masters.181 Congress aimed broadly in passing the Act to
counteract the Codes and included the employment context within the
purview of the contracts clause of the Act. Nonetheless, the general
aims of the Act fail to indicate that Congress intended to include pro
tection for the misrepresenting party in the voidable contract context,
the tester in this case.182
A reading of the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reveals
only three discussions regarding the nature of the contracts provision
of the statute.183 Although these instances illustrate that Congress con179. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull, spon
sor of the legislation).
180. In the period between the end of the Civil War and the initiation of congressional
Reconstruction, most of the states of the former Confederacy passed harsh criminal and civil
provisions restricting the rights of newly freed slaves. ROBERT CRUDEN, THE NEGRO IN
RECONSTRUCTION 27 {1969). These laws are collectively referred to as the Black Codes. Id.
181. In South Carolina, for example, black children, whose parents the courts deemed
incapable of caring for them, were forcibly apprenticed, usually to their former slave mas
ters, and all blacks were legally bound to enter into labor contracts. CRUDEN, supra note
180, at 21. In Mississippi, freedmen were required to enter into employment contracts by the
second Monday in January of 1866 or face criminal sanctions. VERNON LANE WHARTON,
THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890 87-88 {1984). The Florida law relating to the employ
ment of freedmen permitted a black person to be "punished as for vagrancy if, on complaint
of his master, he were convicted of 'willful disobedience of orders, wanton impudence, or
disrespect to his employer or his authorized agent, fa ilure to perform his work assigned to
him, idleness, or abandonment of the premises.' THEODORE BRANTER WILSON, THE
BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 99 {1965).
"

182. See infra notes 183-188 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 168-173 and
accompanying text.
183. Given the concern of many senators over miscegenation, the first instance involved
discussion over the applicability of the contracts language to marriage contracts. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505-06 {1866); see also Veto Message of President Johnson,
Civil Rights Act of 1866, April 27, 1866, reprinted in id. at 1680 (discussing the effect of the
legislation upon the states' ability to enact anti-miscegenation laws). The second exchange
concerned whether the granting of citizenship to some Native Americans by the bill would
require states to grant "an Indian the right to contract.'' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
572 (1866). The final question raised regarding the contracts clause asked whether the fed
eral courts could use the Act to create federal contract law or whether the language merely
permitted the courts to enforce state contract laws equally without regard to race; consider
the remarks of Senator Cowan:
Now, a married woman in no State that I know of has a right to make contracts generally. In
some of the States she cannot contract at all; in others she contracts sub modo; and in all
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sidered the extent and purpose of the contracts language later codified
at § 1981, they provide no evidence that Congress intended the con
tracts language to include protection for the formation of voidable
contracts.184 The key to understanding congressional intent lies in the
comparison made clear not only by the terms of the statute but also by
the language of debate about the bill: " [The bill] simply gives to per
sons who are of different races or colors the same civil rights."185 While
the bill was considered "absolutely revolutionary" by many of its sup
porters,186 Congress did not intend for the Act to grant blacks greater
protections than those available to whites but rather equal protec
tions.187 Just as whites cannot found a suit for damages upon a void
able contract, neither may a non-white employment tester base her ar
gument for standing upon such a legally unprotected contract
interest.188
C.

Pro-Standing Policy A rguments: Missing the Mark

Statutory language and original congressional intent provide no
shelter for the tester plaintiff. Nevertheless, standing supporters, in
cluding two circuit courts of appeals,189 argue that two factors favor a
there is a limit upon her power to contract. Is it intended by this bill that it shall be put in the
hands of any judge to decide that this bill confers upon married women the unlimited right
to contract?

Id. at 1781-82 (statement of Sen. Cowan). In a similar vein, Senator Cowan stated:
I need not remind you, sir, that there are a large number of contracts which are not allowed
in the several States, some on account of policy, some on account of morality, and others
upon account of positive injunction to the contrary. A contract in my State made upon the
Sabbath day is void; but under this bill that contract could be enforced. A contract made
against chastity, proh pudor, is void; but under this bill that might be enforced.

Id.
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 163, 164(1) (1978); cf. Kawitt v.
United States, 842 F.2d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 1988).
185. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
186. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Morrill).
187. Id. at 1159 (statement of Rep. Windom) ("(The bill) declares that henceforth . . .
the colored soldier, who has worn the uniform of the Republic and periled his life for its de
fense, shall have an equal right, nothing more, with the white rebel yet reeking with the
blood of our murdered defenders . . . " (emphasis added)); id. at 1293 (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger) ("[The Act's) whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require
that whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be
for and upon all citizens alike without distinctions based on race or former condition in slav
ery.").
188. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) ; Fair Employment
Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
cf. supra note 172.
189. See Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985); Meyers v.
Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1977).
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broad grant of standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: Supreme
Court decisions upholding standing for testers under § 1983190 and the
broad import of civil rights legislation.
The weapon of largest caliber possessed by those who argue in fa
vor of standing for testers under § 1981 owes its manufacture to two
Supreme Court decisions, Evers v. Dwyer191 and Pierson v. Ray,192
which granted standing to testers under § 1983. In Evers, the Court ac
corded standing to a plaintiff who "boarded this particular bus for the
purpose of instituting this litigation. "193 Faced with a similar situation,
the Pierson court found that, although plaintiffs used a whites-only bus
terminal waiting area for the sole purpose of testing the law in ques
tion, "their deliberate exercise of that right in a peaceful, orderly, and
inoffensive manner does not disqualify them from seeking damages
under § 1983."194 Both the Third and Eleventh Circuits relied heavily
upon the Court's holdings in these cases in finding that tester plain
tiffs195 possessed standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.196
These courts, in analyzing the applicability of Evers and Pierson,
ignored several crucial differences between § 1981 and § 1983. In the
context of public facilities, the tester, though seeking to test the law in
question, actually uses the public facility or purchases a ticket with the
intent to use the public facility in question, thus forming the contrac
tual relationship envisioned by the statute.197 The rider of the bus, for
190. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), passed by the Reconstruction Congress as § 1 of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871, provides a cause of action to private citizens for the "deprivation of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by state actors
acting under the "color" of state law.
191. 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam).
192. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
193. Evers, 358 U.S. at 204.
194. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 558.
195. The courts in Meyers and Watts found standing for housing testers under § 1982.
Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods
Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1977). While not directly applicable to
the employment tester context under § 1981, the holdings of these courts do create a circuit
split with the Seventh and D.C. Circuits, which have held that employment testers do not
have standing under § 1981. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 302 (7th Cir.
2000); Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994). This split is created because the Supreme Court has held that sections
1981 and 1982 should not be "construe[d] . . . differently when applied." Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 171 (1976); accord id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 190 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973);
Kyles, 222 F.3d at 301.
196. Meyers, 559 F.2d at 898 (citing both Evers and Pierson for the proposition that
"[e]ven assuming arguendo that . . . [plaintiff's] application to . . . [defendant] was in fact mo
tivated solely by his desire to test the legality of . . . [defendant's] policies, such a purpose is
sufficient to confer standing"); see also Watts, 758 F.2d at 1485 (following Meyers and noting
that Meyers relied upon Evers and Pierson for support).
197. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 304; see also Evers, 358 U.S. at 204 (noting that the bus rider in
question rode the bus and used the public transport).
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example, completes the necessary relationship between himself and
the defendant by purchasing a bus ticket and attempting to ride the
bus. The public facilities tester intends to make use of the public facil
ity, even if her purpose is also to test the law at issue.198 On the other
hand, the employment tester has no intent to form the contractual re
lationship envisioned by the statute.199 Moreover, the language of
Pierson, which notes that the testers neither "tricked [n]or goaded the
officers into arresting them,"200 can be read to exclude employment
testers, who present false credentials and lie during interviews.201
Finally, while the Third and Eleventh Circuits looked to the
Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence without questioning its applica
bility to §§ 1981 or 1982, history counsels against reading the statutes
together as parallel provisions. Section 1983 shares neither a common
source nor a common statutory purpose with §§ 1981 and 1982.202
Sections 1981 and 1982 derive from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, while
§ 1983 owes its birth to the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.203 Sections 1981
and 1982 aim primarily at private conduct, while § 1983 focuses solely
on conduct by state actors.204 In addition, Congress passed § § 1981 and
1982 pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment remedial powers,205 while
it enacted § 1983 under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.206
Although the Court has previously held that §§ 1981 and 1982 should
be given like construction as both statues derive their language from
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,207 the Court has delivered no such

198. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 304.
199. See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text; see also Kyles, 222 F.3d at 304
("[T]o put it in Evers' context, [the employment tester] . . . never set[s] foot on the bus.").
200. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967).
201. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d
1268, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[T]he [employment] testers here made conscious and mate
rial misrepresentations of fact by deceiving BMC [the defendant] about their intentions and
by presenting BMC with fictitious credentials.").
202. Alice M. Beasley and Gail J. Wright, The Civil Rights Acts Revisited, 357
PLl/LJTJG. 785, 788 (1 988).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1866) (statement of Sen. Hendricks)
("[T]he provisions of this bill are admirably calculated to secure to these colored persons
their rights under the [thirteenth] constitutional amendment."); id. at 474, 503 (statements of
Sens. Howard and Trumbull, the bill's sponsor) (also noting that the bill intended to give
effect to the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) ("[Section 1982] is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.").
206. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
207. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 171 (1976).
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�diet regarding comparisons between § § 1981 and 1982 and § 1983.208
Thus, the contention that the Supreme Court's § 1983 tester jurispru
dence buttresses the argument for employment tester standing fails, as
the § 1983 tester cases are inapposite to the employment tester context
under § 1981.
Nevertheless, the broad purposes of civil rights legislation sing a si
ren's song for standing supporters. Some argue that the courts should
liberally interpret § 1981 in order to effectuate Congress's intent to
eliminate discriminatory contracting practices.209 In Watts v. Boyd
Properties,210 the Eleventh Circuit accepted the argument that a broad
reading of standing doctrine was critical to enforcement of the provi
sions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its goal of "eliminat[ing] 'the
badges and incidents of slavery.' "21 1 While correctly noting that the
legislation giving rise to § 1981 aimed to eliminate discrimination in
broad strokes,212 these arguments do not independently support a
finding of standing. Rather, they merely beg the question of congres
sional intent behind the statute, for the proper effect to be given leg
islation lies not in the mind of the judge or legal commentator but
must instead be surmised from the intent of the relevant Congress.213
Congress alone has the power, under § 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, to outlaw the "badges and incidents of slavery" and to
remedy their effects through appropriate legislation.214 While an over
broad reading of § 1981 serves the desires of tester standing support
ers, such a reading was not within the scope of the statute as envi
sioned by the 39th Congress.215 Of course, "Congress could have
elected to grant standing to plaintiffs to sue [under § 1981] when they
were denied . . . a voidable contract,"216 but it did not. Such an over
sight can be properly corrected only by congressional action to amend
§ 1981, not judicial fiat.
208. See id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I consider the posture of §§ 1981 and 1982
in the j urisprudence of this Court to be quite different from that of § 1983.").
209. See Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985); Landever, supra
note 13, at 394.
210. 758 F.2d 1482 (1985).
211. Id. at 1485.
212. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
213. Cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) ("Although we have found
immunities in § 1983 that do not appear on the face of the statute, '(w]e do not have a license
to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound
public policy.' " (internal citations omitted)); see also id. ("[O]ur role is to interpret the in
tent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice.'' (internal ci
tations omitted)).
214. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
215. See supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text (discussing congressional debate
surrounding passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
216. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) .
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III. LIMITED ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY AND STANDING FOR
EMPLOYMENT TESTERS

This Part addresses the policy considerations underlying the
standing doctrine and argues that the courts should deny standing in
order to serve these policy interests effectively. Section III.A contends
that denying standing to employment testers serves the principle of
separation of powers by recognizing the singular role of Congress in
creating statutory bases for standing. Section IIl.B notes that the po
litical process can adequately address concerns over judicial activity in
the area of civil rights, eliminating the need for activist courts to create
a basis for tester standing.
A.

Valuing the Separation-of-Powers Principle21 7

As outlined in Parts I and II, the doctrine of standing encompasses
two separate but interrelated frameworks for analyzing the right of an
individual plaintiff to bring suit in federal court: the prudential and the
constitutional.218 Both the prudential and constitutional components of
the doctrine of standing are fo unded in concerns over judicial self
governance, as both seek to limit the interference of the Judiciary in
the affairs of the political branches.219 In Allen v. Wright,220 the Court
gave substance to this concern by emphasizing that the principle of
separation of powers guides its exposition of the doctrine of stand
ing.221 Relying on the separation of powers principle, the Court has de
termined that appropriate use of the standing doctrine can help the
Judiciary to avoid straying beyond its proper constitutional role and

217. This Note does not address the myriad constitutional issues surrounding the role of
the Judiciary and the separation of powers principle. Rather, this Note seeks to place the
question of standing for employment testers in the context of the current Court's view of the
standing doctrine as being intimately tied to the principle of separation of powers. See Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 752 (1984).
218. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also supra notes 18-19.
219. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) ("Like their constitutional counterparts,
these 'judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction' are 'founded in
concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic soci
ety.' " (internal citations omitted)); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) ("The
requirement that an inmate alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual injury derives
ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of
law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches.").
220. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
221. Id. at 752. In outlining this new perspective, the Court directly rejected the standing
philosophy of the Warren Court, which ascribed no importance to the principle of separation
of powers in the standing context. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968) ("The question
whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own
force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas
committed to other branches of the Federal Government.").
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into the realm of lawmaking.222 Denying standing to employment test
ers furthers this judicial goal, by illustrating the Judiciary's recognition
of the singular role of Congress in creating statutory bases for a plain
tiff's standing.
While the Court has generally expounded upon this ideal in the
context of constitutional cases or cases seeking injunctions to force the
hand of a government agency,223 the principle of separation of powers
can also play an important role in guiding the Court's determinations
regarding statutory bases for standing in suits between private parties.
Absent a basis in a remnant of the federal common law, a plaintiff
must establish his claim of standing upon either constitutional or statu
tory ground. In the constitutional realm, the Court has the preeminent
role in defining a citizen's right to invoke the power of the Judiciary
under a particular constitutional provision.224 In cases founded upon
statutory grounds, on the other hand, Congress exercises plenary
authority in defining the duties attendant and remedies afforded to
potential plaintiffs, including the right to invoke the judicial power.225

222 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); see also
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 744 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The dangers
posed by judicial arrogation of the right to resolve general societal conflicts have been mani
fest to this Court throughout its history.").
223. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (denying standing to members of
Congress challenging Line-Item Veto Act); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161 (1991)
(denying standing to death-row inmate who challenged the lack of appellate review of a fel
low inmate's conviction under the Eighth Amendment); Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-60 (refusing
to hear case, on standing grounds, that attempted to enjoin the IRS to more stringently
manage the grant of tax-exempt status to private schools); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (denying standing
to civil liberties organization that challenged on Establishment Clause grounds the transfer
of government-owned property by a federal agency to a religious university); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974) (declining, based on plain
tiffs' lack of injury-in-fact, to hear case challenging "reserve" military status of several mem
bers of Congress under Art. I, § 6, cl. 2).
224. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 375 (1983):
[T]he federal courts have jurisdiction to decide all cases 'aris(ing] under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.' This jurisdictional grant provides not only the author
ity to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiffs claim that he has been injured
by a violation of the Constitution, but also the authority to choose among available judicial
remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights. (internal citations omitted).
See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 391-92 (1971) (recognizing private cause of action for damages against federal agents for
violations of the Fourth Amendment); cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.").
225. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578, 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(1992). The Court, however, has not permitted Congress to run roughshod over the Article
lII requirements of standing. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100
(1979). In fact, where Congress has attempted to afford a judicial remedy to plaintiffs who
lacked an injury-in-fact, the Court has denied standing on Article III grounds. See,
e.g., Raines, 521 U.S. at 818 (denying standing due to lack of constitutionally-required
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The extension of standing to areas, such as employment testing, where
Congress has not made clear its intent to create statutory protection,
constitutes an impermissible legislative act on the part of the
Judiciary.226 Only by demanding that Congress create a specific right,
the invasion of which would create standing to sue, can the Court reaf
firm the proper balance of power between the legislative and judicial
spheres of the government.227
The courts have previously declined to exercise their judicial
power where Congress has not evinced its intent to create a cause of
action applicable to the plaintiff.228 In declining to recognize the right
of particular plaintiffs to maintain a cause of action absent the explicit
intention of Congress to provide either a right or remedy to the plain
tiff, the courts have noted that only Congress may create a private
right of action to enforce federal law.229 Admittedly, " [s]tanding is a
concept distinct from the concept of private rights of action. "230 Never
theless, in light of the Court's recent concern over maintaining proper
limits upon the exercise of the judicial power,231 taking the same ap
proach with regard to statutory standing as has been taken with regard
to private rights of action would serve the separation-of-powers con
cerns that have come to predominate the Court's standing jurispru
dence. In fact, the Court's approach to analyzing whether or not
Congress has intended to create a private right of action mirrors in
many respects the Court's analysis of both whether a plaintiff has suf
fered an injury cognizable under the statute in question and whether
the plaintiff falls within the statute's intended zone of interests.232 The
injury-in-fa ct even where Act itself granted to members of Congress the "right" to challenge
statute in federal court).
226. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 473 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[W)e cannot argumentatively legislate for Congress when
Congress has failed to legislate. To do so disrespects legislative responsibility and disregards
judicial limitations.").
227. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 ("When Congress intends private litigants to have a
cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as
much when it creates those rights.").
228. See, e.g., Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 752 (D.C. Cir.
1990) ("[The] generalized action plaintiffs pursue against federal executive agencies lacks
the requisite green light from the legislative branch. We do not suggest that such an action
could not be authorized. The courts, however, may not on their own initiative create the
claim for relief. That authority resides in Congress." (internal citations omitted)).
229. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001 ) (citing Touche Ross
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)).

&

Co. v.

230. Louisiana Landmarks Soc., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 11 19, 1122 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1 996).
231. See supra note 223.
232. Compare Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 579-80 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recog
nizing that the preeminent factor in determining whether private cause of action was created
is whether plaintiff is among "the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"),
with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 {1992) {Kennedy, J., concurring) (rec-
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key question in analyzing whether Congress has intended to create a
private right of action is whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."233 In analyzing statu
tory standing within the framework of Article Ill's standing require
ments, the Court has indicated that Congress must demonstrate its in
tent to identify both the statutory injury and the class of persons
entitled to enforce the statutory mandate.234 Even more clearly analo
gous, the Court's zone-of-interests criterion asks the question whether
the plaintiff is among those "protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question."235 Given the parallels between
these two analyses, the lens used by the Court to evaluate questions of
statutory standing should be at least as demanding as that used to
evaluate questions surrounding private causes of action, as questions
of standing go to the heart of the judicial power itself.236
Applying this broader assertion to the more specific context of
employment tester standing under Title VII and § 1981, standing for
employment testers must be denied precisely because Congress has
failed to evince its intention either to include testers within the class of
plaintiffs whose injury is cognizable under Article III for Title VII
purposes237 or to bring testers within the class to be protected by the
terms of § 1981.238 Denying standing to employment testers thus serves
the principle of separation of powers by avoiding the "overjudicializa
tion of the processes of self-governance."239 Instead of creating judge
made law in the statutory realm,240 refusing to grant standing to em
ployment testers under the current statutory scheme places the onus
of providing statutory protection to employment testers on the politi
cal branches, the branches who should bear the ultimate responsibility
in our system of divided powers for defining statutory rights and
remedies.241
ognizing need, under Article III, for Congress to "at the very least identify the injury it seeks
to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit"), and Ass'n of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 31J7 U.S. 150, 153 (11J70) (outlining the zone of inter
ests test).
233. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 26 n.3 (1979); accord
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (1988).
234. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
235. Ass'n ofData Processing Serv. Orgs., 31J7 U.S. at 153.
236. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
237. See supra notes 44-68, 90-98 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 168-188 and accompanying text.
239. Scalia, supra note 31, at 881.
240. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
241. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 109-10 (1901) ("[B)y adhering
rigidly to its own duty, the court will help, as nothing else can, to fix the spot where respon
sibility lies, and to bring down on that precise locality the thunderbolt of popular condemna
tion . . . . For that course - the true course of judicial duty always - will powerfully help to
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Recognizing Congressional Responsibility

In addition to executing its proper role in the tripartite system of
federal governance, by denying standing to employment testers the
Judiciary would also be taking notice of Congress's proven ability to
clarify and expand legislation, especially in the area of civil rights, in
response to judicial pronouncements.242 In fact, the Court has recog
nized that Congress has the power to refine and create statutory bases
for standing where the Court has not previously found a sufficient
foundation on which to rest standing.243
Congress has not failed to take note of the Court's invitations.244
With passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example, Congress
acted to supersede Court rulings that had narrowly interpreted Title
VII and § 1981.245 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. A tonio,246 the Court
altered the burden upon the defendant in a disparate impact case un
der Title VII, holding that an employer need only provide evidence
that its employment practice is legitimate to rebut plaintiff's disparate
impact claim and that the employer's burden on this point would be
one of production rather than persuasion.247 In Patterson v. McLean

bring the people and their representatives to a sense of their own responsibility."); see also
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60 ("Obviously, then, the Constitution's central mechanism of separa
tion of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropri
ate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.").
242. Cf Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (declining to create Bivens-style
damages remedy against federal officials under Title II of Social Security Act due to, inter
alia, frequent congressional attention to issues surrounding Act).
243. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) ("Congress may enact stat
utes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury
would exist without the statute."); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 ("Nothing in this [opinion]
contradicts the principle that (t]he . . . injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.") (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
244. See, for example, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259,
107 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.
(1 994)), which, inter alia, amended Title IX to reflect Congress's belief that a finding of dis
crimination in any program within an institution permitted the Department of Education to
terminate applicable federal funding to the entire institution, legislatively overruling Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994)), in which Congress re
sponded to the Court's determination in Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46
(1976), that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not impermissible sex discrimina
tion under Title VII; and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994)), which responded to
the Court's refusal to award attorney's fees in contravention of the "American rule" in
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1 975).
245. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
tered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
246. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
247. Id. at 650-51.

L.

No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scat
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Credit Union,248 the Court determined that § 1981's protection against
racial discrimination in the "making and enforcement" of contracts did
not extend to on-the-job discrimination after the initial contract for
mation.249 The 1991 Act specifically responded to the Wards Cove de
cision, naming the decision in the Act and including provisions specifi
cally directed at reversing the Court's holding.250 The Act also
supplanted Patterson by redefining the "making and enforcement of
contracts" in § 1981 to include "performance, modification, and termi
nation of contracts" within its ambit.251
These instances illustrate both the power and the attention of
Congress in the area of civil rights. Supporters of standing for em
ployment testers need not fear that adverse judicial pronouncements
will forever doom their prospects for creating a statutory haven for
tester activities. Congress has the ability and has evinced the will to
amend civil rights statutes to effect its intent where the courts have
adopted limiting constructions of civil rights legislation. Moreover, as
the branch invested with the will of the people, the legislature's pro
nouncements more accurately reflect the societal purposes of civil
rights legislation than the countermajoritarian visions of the judges
and justices of the federal Judiciary.
CONCLUSION

While this Note does not argue that society should tum a blind eye
to the effects of discrimination even upon employment testers, this
Note illustrates that the legal system was not designed to provide
automatic protection to members of protected classes from all in
stances of discrimination. An employment tester must rely on either a
constitutional or statutory basis in which to ground her standing. This
Note shows, however, that neither Title VII nor § 1981 provides such a
foundation for employment tester standing.
While Title VII and § 1981 aim broadly at the effects of discrimina
tion in the field of employment, neither the statutory text nor congres
sional intent behind either Title VII or § 1981 reveal an intent to in
clude testers in the umbrella of statutory protection or the statutory
zone of interests. Moreover, the policy arguments proffered by sup
porters of standing fail to address the fatal lack of a proper statutory
basis for standing under either Title VII or § 1981. Finally, this Note
shows that denying tester standing serves the important interest in
separation of powers that the Court has made central to the standing

248. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
249. Id. at 171.
250. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2.
251. 42 u.s.c. § 1981(b) (1994).
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analysis. By denying standing to employment testers, the courts will
give respect to the principles of standing in the employment law con
text while also maintaining the proper balance of power between the
Judiciary and the Legislature.

